← ARCHIVE / CASE-20140216-KICKSTAR
CASE FILE CASE-20140216-KICKSTAR

Kickstarter

kickstarter.com
CRITICAL
5,176,463 ACCOUNTS
FEB 2014 BREACH DATE
2 DATA TYPES
44mo DARK PERIOD

EVIDENCE FILE

CASE CONTEXT

This TRACED record summarizes the public breach profile for Kickstarter. The file tracks the known incident date, the date the breach surfaced publicly, the estimated account exposure, and whether Have I Been Pwned currently marks the case as verified. It is written for quick risk review, source attribution, and follow-up checks by people who need a plain-English view of what was exposed.

The reported data classes include Email addresses, Passwords. If the case includes passwords, reused credentials should be treated as compromised and replaced anywhere they were used. The password checker on TRACED uses the Have I Been Pwned k-anonymity range API so the full password is never sent off the device.

Each case page is intentionally narrow: it separates the public incident record from account recovery advice, keeps the source data visible, and avoids collecting visitor identifiers. Use it as a starting point for reviewing exposure, then confirm account-specific impact with the affected service and your password manager.

RISK REVIEW

The affected data classes for Kickstarter are listed as Email addresses, Passwords. TRACED repeats those fields in plain language because the practical response depends on the type of information exposed. Email addresses and usernames can support phishing or account enumeration, profile data can help with impersonation, and financial or government identifiers require a more careful fraud review.

Have I Been Pwned currently marks this breach as verified, which means the service has reviewed the incident record against its source standards. The breach date is recorded as FEB 2014, and the exposure estimate is 5,176,463 accounts. Those numbers describe the public incident record, not a guarantee that a specific visitor had an account in the service or that every exposed record contained the same fields.

Because this breach includes password data, reused passwords should be replaced anywhere they appear. A unique password manager entry and multi-factor authentication are the safest follow-up steps. HIBP does not mark this breach as sensitive, but the exposed data can still matter if it helps attackers identify, profile, or credential-stuff affected users. For personal cleanup, start with password reuse, two-factor settings, recovery email security, and alerts from the affected service. For research, use the case file as a source pointer and compare it with the original HIBP entry before citing exact impact.

DISCOVERY GAP

DISCOVERY GAPTime between breach occurrence and public disclosure
BREACH OCCURREDFEB 2014
3 years, 8 months dark
DATA SURFACEDOCT 2017

This breach went undetected for over 3 years. Data was actively in circulation during this window.

REDACTED EVIDENCE

PASSWORD DATA CLASSIFIED
████████████ ████████ ████████████████
████████████████████ ████████████ ████████

If this breach included passwords, treat them as compromised. If they were reused anywhere else, change them there too.

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